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A review of some of the current thinking pertaining to suboptimiza-
tion and decentralization is conducted. Ruefli's Generalized Goal
Decomposition Model is discussed with emphasis placed upon description
of the informational requirements necessary for the iterative process and
the constraints necessary for the model to function. The Generalized
Goal Decomposition Model is extended to include quadratic deviations from
goals. The nature of weighting factors in an organizational context is
examined. Some current methods for determining weighting factors for
goal programing problems are presented. A goal programing method using
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I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing size and complexity that characterize the organizations
that are found in almost every facet of our economy make it imperative to
understand the manner in which they function. One may be faced with the
question of whether or not to allow the organizational levels to retain
their current functions more or less unchanged, or to reallocate the
functions among the levels, or to strengthen or weaken the powers of the
central unit. Before such questions can be answered one must have an
understanding of the way an organization works in order to attempt to
control or modify the results of the organization. "The choice of a
resource allocation mechanism must be made with reference to the class of
environments to be covered and in the light of some comparative valuation
of the different dimensions of the performance characteristics."
If all aspects impinging upon the organization were known and un-
changing and no computational difficulties existed, the problems that the
organization faced could be solved without subdividing these problems.
If all the aspects of a problem were known, there would be little point
in using anything other than a centralized decision procedure. The problems
could either be solved by the central unit or passed on to subordinates
with explicit instructions which would insure that the solution obtained
by the subordinates would, in fact, be the same as that obtained by the
central unit. However, objectives do not remain fixed, but evolve through
Hurwicz, L., "Optimality and Informational Efficiency in Resource
Allocation Processes," Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, 1959
,
Arrow, K. J., Karlin, S., and Suppes, P., eds., p. 29, Stanford University
Press, 1960.

external effects and experience. In the real world, it is necessary to
divide the problems into components that are meaningful according to
relevant criteria.
Either suboptimization or decentralization can be utilized when a
lack of information and/or conditions of uncertainty exist. According to
Smithies [9], suboptimization can be considered as the factoring of the
total problem into subproblems. It does not imply any delegation of
authority, while decentralization does involve some degree of delegation
of decision making authority. Due to its nature, decentralization tends
to involve some conflict in the point of view between the central unit
and its subordinates.
The conditions for suboptimization parallel the conditions for under-
taking decentralization. These are as follows:
1) The total program should be factored into components
whose outputs are meaningful for the organization
and if possible they should be measurable;
2) There should be no significant interaction between
the design of the suboptimized system and the other
variables in the system.
3
With regard to suboptimization, Smithies states further that: "A neces-
sary and sufficient condition for suboptimization with respect to a group
of variables of the total system is that the marginal rate of substitution
among members of the group is independent of the value of the variables
outside the group. "^
2Smithies, A., "PPBS, Suboptimization and Decentralization, 1^. 1, RAND,
RM-6178-PR, April 1970.
3 Ibid., p. 3.
4 Ibid.

Even though it may not be possible for an organization to strictly
meet these conditions, there is still a need for suboptimization in the
decision making process. Optimization which includes the use of sub-
optimization may continue to be utilized with the recognition that lack
of information and uncertainty are inherent in the system. Stated in
another way, suboptimization maximizes an objective function which is
factored out of the total objective function, while decentralization
implies maximization of some objective function unique to the decentral-
ized decision maker. 5 The decision maker may approach a given problem
more effectively in terms of subproblems because of a lack of information
about objective costs and technology. From the knowledge that is gained
by dealing with the subproblems, the decision maker gradually builds up
a solution.
If there are no conflicts of interest within the organization,
decisions can be made by the central unit with suboptimization being used
only as a device to assist the decision maker. This is the same as saying
that there is full harmony between subordinates and superiors in the
organization. However, with decentralization and its accompanying
delegation of authority, there may be a risk of giving rise to conflicts
of interest. Advocacy positions within the organization produce some
divergence of interest between subordinates and superiors.
The approach to a problem can be simplified by reducing the number
of externalities affecting its solution; however, the overall objective
function usually remains unknown. In order to optimize a given problem,
there must first be a knowledge of technological tradeoffs, which is
5 Ibid., p. 12.

supposedly determined by the suboptimizers, and there must also be a
knowledge of the relative weights that should be allocated to the various
criteria. These weights are determined by interactions between the central
unit and the subordinates.
There are numerous advantages and disadvantages to decentralization.
In decentralization, individuals or groups have more opportunity to
exercise initiative; however, a centralized unit may have greater flexi-
bility and quicker response. Decentralization tends to reduce information
costs. It also may cause some duplication of effort. All in all the
diversity of decentralization may be preferred to the consistent adherence
to an objective function which may be incorrect, a situation which is
entirely possible under conditions of uncertainty and lack of knowledge.
Marschak, T. , "Centralization and Decentralization in Economic
Organizations," Econometrica
, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 400, July 1959.

II. GENERALIZED GOAL DECOMPOSITION MODEL
WITH LINEAR DEVIATIONS
The way in which elements are organized in great part determines the
solution. Ruefli [7] has shown this in his Generalized Goal Decomposi-
tion Model. Buchanan [1] says essentially the same thing when he states
that costs/benefits vary over different organizations because who deter-
mines these factors varies. Crecine [2] reinforces Buchanan's point in
a counter example. He shows that even though the DOD planning process
has changed to programs, the budgetary decisions (which drive the system)
are made by the same persons, so the solutions generated have much in
common over the years.
As mentioned above, T. W. Ruefli has proposed a model of a decision
making organization where the solutions depend upon the structure of the
organization. His model is structure dependent and goal oriented. It
involves a three level organization where his intermediate units or
management units allow the central unit to evaluate its goal generating
policies while they guide the alternative generation activities of the
operating unit level. (See Fig. 1.)
The management units solve a resource allocation problem stated in
goal programing form in which each management unit minimizes the weighted
sum of deviations from the goals. The weights are determined a priori .
The following formulation delineates the management units' problem, with
symbols employed as stated.
'Ruefli, T. W., "A Generalized Goal Decomposition Model," Management
Science
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V Y "k i °
j = l,...,n,, operating units subordinate to the kth management unit
k = 1,...,M management units
G. e Vector of Resources (Goals)
/+ v- -YT,Y" s Vectors of Positive and Negative Deviations from Goals
,+ .,-
Wk ,Wk
= Weights for Positive and Negative Goal Deviations.
A. = Matrix of Attributes of Project Proposals for all n k subordinate
operating units.
x^ = Vector of Activity Levels for Project Proposals.
Ruefli utilizes the following dual problem to generate "shadow prices."
A negative shadow price means that the particular management unit has
failed to meet a goal. A positive shadow price indicates that the manage-
ment unit has exceeded the goal.
10

k*h management unit (Dual)
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n. < failed to meet goals
n^ > exceeded goals
Shadow prices are passed up and down by management units. These
shadow prices are the inputed value of the goal constraints. Operating
units generate alternative proposals for their superior management unit
in response to the "shadow prices" generated by the management unit. This





















(Technology) (Proposal) (Stipulations) or
(Minimum Output Levels)
Aj,k^°
The central unit generates goals that maximize the inputed values of
goals as determined by all management units subject to resource constraints
The formulation is as follows:
Central Unit
M

















As can be seen the goal levels are not fixed throughout the problem.
The central unit modifies its goals based on information that the manage-
ment units provide in terms of shadow prices. This can be considered as
functioning like a type of feedback system so that goals (allocations)
can be challenged or changed. Shubik maintains that this is of importance
o
in a functioning decentralized organization.
It is important to remember that shadow prices are variables for the
management units while they are considered fixed by the central unit and
operating units. The process described continues until the management
units' weighted deviations are at a minimum and no readjustment of goal
levels by the central unit or modification of proposals by the operating
units will decrease the weighted deviations from the goals for the whole
organization. However, activity levels goals and preemptive goals must
be communicated at the start in order for the model to function.
Ruef 1 i makes many assumptions concerning externalities. If externali-
ties exist between operating units under the same management unit, then
these externalities are contained in the objective function of the
management unit. If the externalities exist between management units,
the externalities are contained in the objective function of the central
unit. If externalities are present between operating units under different
management units, the central unit passes down upper limits on goal levels
g
in the initial conditions.
^Shubik, M., "Budgets in a Decentralized Organization with Incomplete
Information," p. 4, RAND, P-4514, December 1970.
9Ruefli, op. cit., p. B-512.
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Ruefli shows that without technology or goal dependencies the system
will converge to the optimum (in a goal programing sense) in a finite
number of steps. If the dependencies are present, the system may cycle.
If externalities are present, we cannot insure that the model will converge
in a finite number of steps. In fact one cannot guarantee that cycling will
be the worst the model will do. It may diverge indefinitely. Therefore,
the levels of the organization are assumed to be horizontally independent.
The following is a general idea of what Ruefli's model is doing during
iterations. An understanding of this interplay between levels is necessary
to see the relevance of the model to organizational functioning.
The central unit initiates the procedure by giving each management
unit prospective indices. Each initial index contains information about
production or resource goals which probably reflects current operating
conditions and a "best guess" in forecasting goal levels.
The management units generate shadow prices where a negative shadow
price indicates that the management unit has failed to meet a goal level
for that particular component of the goal vector. A positive shadow price
indicates that a goal level has been exceeded.
The central unit attempts to lessen the deviation from the goals at
the management level by trying to raise the goal levels for goals that
have been exceeded by the management units and by trying to lower the goal
levels for the goals the management units have failed to meet.
On the other hand, the operating units try to lessen the deviation
from the goals by generating proposals that better meet the goals for goal
levels that are not met, and proposals that reduce the production of goal
Ruefli, T. W. , "Behavioral Externalities in Decentralized
Organizations," Management Science, Vol. 9, No. 5, p. B-652, June 1971
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levels for those that have exceeded the desired goal levels. In other
words, if a goal level is exceeded, the central unit raises the goal
level and the operating units lower the goal production. If a goal
level is not met, the central unit lowers the goal level, and the oper-
ating unit increases goal production. In this manner both the
superordinate and the subordinate units are attempting to reduce the
weighted goal deviation of the management units.
Ruefli places no restrictions upon the weightings that are assigned
a priori to the deviations from the goals. However, in order to have
the organization function with any degree of harmony or consensus of
purpose, some restrictions are needed. If a management unit really
desired to over-produce a certain goal or set the goal at the "correct"
higher level, it would assign a negative value to the weighting of the
positive deviation (W^"1"),
In this manner, it would minimize the weighted sum of the goal
deviations by exceeding the one goal level by as much as possible. Such
behavior in an organization would not be tolerated for long. The model
itself handles this "problem" in a unique manner. The assignment of a
negative value to \+ would cause the lower bound of the shadow price
(n^) to always be a positive number if the problem was feasible. The
last two groups of constraints in the dual formulation help to define




if W^ has a negative value, then it can be seen that n^ is restricted
to a nonnegative value.
15

The weighting factor for the negative deviation (Wk
~) would determine
the following bound :
nk 1 wk"
(Wk
~ is assumed to be a positive value in the context of the management
trying to overproduce this particular goal.)
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In Case III, it can be seen that no feasible region for n k exists
since a value for n k cannot simultaneously be <k and >k + e. So if Wk
+





, the model would
not function since there would be no feasible value for n k , i.e. the
constraints would not be consistent.
It is obvious in Case I and Case II that the only possible values for
n k are positive. This would get a higher goal level from the central unit,
16

but would cause the operating units to reduce the production of this
goal to a minimum because it would always perceive that the management
unit was overproducing that particular goal. If the management unit
assigned a value of zero to a weighting factor, this would mean that
deviations in a particular direction from a prescribed goal were unimpor-
tant. And as such, the goal level would cease to function except as
either an upper or lower bound. If both positive and negative deviations
were weighted zero then that particular goal would cease to exist alto-
gether in the context of this model. In most cases, this type of
behavior from a subordinate would hinder an organization.
A similar argument can be made for the assignment of a negative value
to the weighting factor for negative deviations (Wk~). The view of the
management unit would be to underproduce the particular goal level as
much as possible.
It shall be assumed that Wk
+
, W k




f 0. In this
way the central unit has a system where management units are encouraged
to further the interests of the organization, and, at the same time, are
constrained from impairing its interests. It is possible to express a
goal as an acceptable range of goal level production. This "goal" would
i






= 0. The upper bound would have W
k
~ = ; Wk
+
> 0. Levels of
proposals that provide production of the goal between the upper and lower




III. GENERALIZED GOAL DECOMPOSITION MODEL
WITH QUADRATIC DEVIATIONS
We have seen how the Generalized Goal Decomposition Model functions
using a linear relationship to determine the goal deviations at the
management unit level. However, the management units may view large
deviations as much more unsatisfactory than smaller deviations. A
possible model for this point of view would be to consider the measure
of the deviations as a quadratic function as opposed to the linear
function Ruefli uses in his model.
This change of viewpoint can be seen in the following formulation
of the primal and dual problems at the management unit level. As will
be shown, there is no necessity to change the formulation at the central
unit or operating unit levels because the shadow prices the management
unit sends up and down still reflect whether the particular management
unit has exceeded a goal or failed to meet a goal. Only the manner in
which deviations are measured has changed.
Hadley [3] shows that the primal and dual problems can be constructed
in the following manner:
Primal
:
Maximize ex + x'Dx
subject to Ax = b
x >_
Dual:
Minimize -x'Dx + X'b




The quadratic goal deviation formulation can be changed to a
minimization problem in the following manner:
min f(x) = - max -f(x)
Utilization of the negative of C and D will be tantamount to working
a quadratic minimization problem which is what is desired. Since the
n
-
- 2 + t 2
problem is to minimize l W^ [Y^) + W^ (_Y.) for a particular manage-
i=l
]
ment unit (where W-j are the weighting factors for the positive and
negative deviations and Y- are those deviations), it can be seen that
C = 0.
X" in Hadley's formulation is equivalent to (x\ Y^ , Y.~) in the
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is n^xl vector of activity levels.
is mxl vector of positive deviation.
is mxl vector of negative deviations.
is mxm matrix with the negative of the weighting factors
for the positive deviations along the diagonal and zero
elsewhere.
is mxm matrix with the negative of the weighting factors
for the negative deviations along the diagonal and zero
elsewhere.
is a rnxn^ matrix where each column is a proposal from
one of the n^ subordinate operating units.
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G. is a mxl vector of goals.
n^ is a mxl vector of shadow prices
Im is a mxm identity matrix.m
k
As can be seen by the dual formulation the objective function contains
both the inputed value of the goals and a function of the deviations.
This change of point of view says that the management unit will pick as
optimum the minimum value of the weighted sum of the deviations squared
plus the inputed value of the goals, subject ot constraints on n. which
are 2Yk times the weighting factor as opposed to just the weighting
factor in the linear model.
However, the shadow prices determined in the dual problem measure
the same thing as in the linear formulation, i.e. a positive value means
that a goal level has been exceeded while a negative value for a shadow
price means that a goal level has not been met.
The central unit and operating units would use this information (the
shadow prices) in the same manner as in the linear formulation and modify
the goal levels and proposals in attempting to assist the management
units to further minimize the deviations from the goals.
Both the linear and quadratic formulation of the management units'
problem would cause the organizational model to function in the same way.
Only the method by which deviations are measured has changed.
22

IV. DISCUSSION OF WEIGHTING FACTORS AND GOALS
Ruefli's Generalized Goal Decomposition Model provides a descriptive
insight into the multilevel decentralized organization. But it has been
seen that the solution determined by the model is not only structure
dependent but is also a function of the weights assigned to the deviations.
In the model the weights are determined a priori . In order to increase
the generalization of Ruefli's model, the next logical step is to determine
some method for obtaining the weighting factors.
Before attempting to determine a suitable method for fixing the
weighting factors, it is first necessary to understand the nature of both
those weighting factors and the goal levels found in the model. Optimiza-
tion first involves knowledge of technology tradeoffs which the
suboptimizer is supposed to learn through understanding of his own sphere
of interest. The relative weights must also be known. They must be
determined by empirical or implicit processes involving interactions
between the central unit and the management units.
A typical Dissatisfaction-Deviation diagram can be seen in Figure 2.
The slope of the line is equivalent to the weighting factor for positive
deviations, 1/iL . For the weighting factor for negative deviations, W^",
the line would be to the left of the vertical.
In order to perceive the characteristics of a goal level in the model,
one must know what purpose the goal level is to serve, or what information
it is to provide. Goals in the model can be placed into one of four
categories according to the desired result of the goal.
1. Lower Bounds: The "goal" in the model specifies the lower bound









deviations is assigned a value of zero (W. + = 0), while the weighting
factor for negative deviations has some positive value (W,~ > 0).
Production of this goal at the goal level or greater is synonymous with
meeting the goal. Underproduction of the goal would be penalized by
causing an increase in the weighted sum of goal deviations. (See Figure 3.)
2. Upper Bounds : The "goal" in the model specifies the upper bound
for a particular goal's production z the weighting factor for positive
deviations has some positive value (W^ > 0), while the weighting factor
for negative deviations is assigned a value of zero (Wi." = 0). Produc-
tion of this goal at the goal level or lower is synonymous with
satisfying the goal exactly. Overproduction of the goal would be
penalized and underproduction would not be penalized. (See Figure 3.)
3. Acceptable Range: The "goal" in the model would specify an
acceptable range for a particular goal's production. In order to specify
this type o^ goal it is necessary to combine the first two goal types,
upper bound and lower bound. For this goal, two goal levels are required.
One goal level such that G^ < G^ and Wj^ > and W^ = would
- +






upper bound. Production of the goal anywhere in the interval [G|< , G^ ]
would be synonymous with meeting the goal exactly. Goal production less
than the lower bound or greater than the upper bound would be penalized.
4. Exact Goal Level Specification: The "goal" in the model would
specify the exact level for the goal production. Any deviation from this
level would incur a penalty in the form of the increased weighted sum of
the deviations for the management unit. This type of goal can be charac-
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The weighting factors (actually the values assigned to the positive
and negative weighting factors) are a measure of two aspects about the
goal levels. The first aspect the weighting factors measure is the
"importance" or priority of the goal for the organization. The more
important the goal or the higher the priority of the goal, the larger
the relative weights W.~ and W^ . The larger weighting factors tend to
minimize the deviation from a higher priority goal. What the weighting
factors actually do is tell the management unit how much of a penalty
is incurred when a goal level is violated. The more important the goal
the higher the penalty for failing to meet it or overproducing this
goal . (See Figure 4.
)
If the problem were such that at a particular iteration goal levels
could not be met, the weighting factors would indicate the relative
preference the organization has for which goals are to be underproduced
by how much. The lower priority goals with the smaller W ~'s would be
the first to be underproduced. If the problem were structured such
that goal levels were overproduced, the weighting factors would indicate
the organization's relative preference for overproduction. A case may
arise where the satisfying of a particular goal may cause underproduction
of a second goal, while satisfying the second goal may require overpro-
duction of the first goal. The appropriate weighting factors would
indicate the organization's preference.
Whenever a goal level has been specified exactly, the weighting
factors measure a second aspect. This can be defined as the "accuracy"
of the goal level: W^'/w^* = 1 carries the idea that the goal level,
6^, is accurate. Over or under-production are both equally unsatisfactory,




















. (See Figure 4.)
W^yW."1" < 1 carries the idea that the goal level has not been
accurately set because the management unit will be penalized more for
positive deviations than for negative deviations. The goal level has
been set too high. The management unit would first try to meet the goal
exactly. If unable to do so, with a minimized weight deviation from all
goal levels, it would be'more likely to fail to meet that particular goal
because it would be penalized less for being under as opposed to being
over in the production of that goal. If W^' << W^ , the specified goal
level would tend to function as a quasi-upper bound (Figure 5), in other
words the organization would strongly prefer underproduction to over-
production. As W ~ approaches zero from a positive direction, the goal,
G^, approaches the function of that of an upper bound. When W^ = ,
then G. would in fact be an upper bound for the goal level production.
A similar argument can be made for W.'/W^ > 1. This carries the
meaning that the goal level has been set too low. G^ would function as
a quasi-lower bound (Figure 6), and if W. = , G k would function as
a lower bound. It must be remembered that as long as both W. " and W^
are greater than zero, the management unit will attempt to meet the
specified goal level exactly.
When the weighting factors are viewed by the central unit, it must























For cases 1 and 2, assigning the appropriate WV = will cause the
goal to function as desired. For case 3, splitting of desired goal levels
will accomplish the desired result.










because it would believe that it had specified the goal level correctly.
In this case, the organization would be just as badly off if the goal
+
were underproduced as if it were overproduced. If W. f W , the
central unit would readjust the goal level until it was accurately set
and W." = W. + . The size of the weighting factors would reflect the
priority of the central unit for not violating the goal. The size of the
weighting factors would cause the minimized weighted sum of goal devia-
tions to reflect the organization's "proper" priorities.
The management units assess weighting factors from their own parochial
point of view. Each management unit has its own set of priorities for
the goals which it is assigned. For goals it considers as high priorities,
the management unit would like to have the weighting factors chosen so it
could treat whatever goal level it was assigned as a lower bound. If not
an exact lower bound, the management unit would prefer to have the








> Wj~ V J * k
The management unit would suffer a relatively small penalty for over-
production and a relatively large penalty for underproduction. Then if
it is unable to satisfy this particular goal exactly, it would tend to
produce more of the goal since it is penalized less for exceeding the
31

goal than for failing to meet it. Ps such, the management unit will
view whatever goal level passed down by the central unit for what it
(the management unit) considers a high priority goal as a quasi-lower
bound, i.e. it will tend to exceed the given goal level.
For what the management unit views as a low priority goal, a similar





> W..+ Yjj f k
The management units would like to have weighting factors so that if
they are unable to meet the goal level exactly, they tend to present a
solution that incorporates their own priorities _ in other words, one
which allows them to reorder the organizational priorities to be more
in consonance with the priorities of the management unit.
32

V. METHODS FOR DETERMINING THE VALUES FOR WEIGHTING FACTORS
As has been shown in the preceding chapters, the solution is not
only structure dependent, but also is a function of the weights assigned
to the goal deviations. Ruefli has stated that the weights must be
determined a priori. Before the model can begin to function these
weighting factors must be assigned.
The simplest method of assigning values to the weighting factors
(w^-) is to rank from low to high the preference or lack of preference
for deviations from goals (that are as yet unknown) and assign weighting
factors according to this preference ordering. The ranking could be
done by either the central unit or the management units. But such a
concentration of power to assign values to weighting factors disallows
interaction between levels to determine weights. If the objective
function for the central unit is not clearcut, but remains relatively
unknown, the central unit would not have the necessary amount of infor-
mation to make a determination that would be in the best interests of
the organization. If the management units exclusively made the decision
on the weights, they might not know the total picture or how the organi-
zation interfaced with its environment.
Ijiri [5] proposes what can be considered a three-step outline of a
method for determining the value of the weights:
1. Determine if over/under production is satisfactory;
2. fenk the deviations into indifference classes;
3. Assign relative weights within indifference classes.
First, one must determine if over or under production is satisfactory.
As a result of this decision, drop Y^ from the functional. This is
the same as assigning w^- = 0.
33

The decision here is similar to the decision as to what purpose the
goal will serve:








3. Exact Goal Specification (\+ > W." > 0)
If the goals are to project the idea of an acceptable range, then it
is necessary to decide on two subgoals, Gk and Gb , as lower and upper
L U
bounds.
The second step is that of ordering or ranking the deviations. For
+ + +
all Y^" remaining in the functional, i.e. all Y^ with W.~ > 0, start
from the positive or negative deviation which is least important, and
continue ranking until one is achieved as "most important." This is a
lexicographical ordering which indicates that the incompatible multiple
goals are ordered so that goals of a lower rank are satisfied only after
those in a higher rank are satisfied or have been satisfied as much as
possible subject to the constraints. If a ranking determination between
goals cannot be made, they are assigned to the same indifference class.
M goals are now classified into K indifference classes.
Assign each variable in the j tn rank a "preemptive priority factor,"
M,- (j=l,...,k) such that M_- - >» M. (j=l ,. . . ,k-l ), i.e. no number
11
n exists such that n M, > M. ,. .
J - j+1
If each goal belonged to a separate indifference class, the goal
programing problem could easily be solved by building up sequential
solutions. The goal with the highest rank would be satisfied as well as
possible. Then one would go sequentially to the next lower ranked goal.
•'Ijiri, Y., Management Goals and Accounting for Control, p. 46,
North-Holland Publishing Company, 1965.
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Ijiri may need finer divisions for deviations because the orderings
undertaken may depend upon the distances which remain for Yi/\ He assigns
pseudo goal levels in the form of a step function. When this idea is
placed on a dissatisfaction-deviation diagram, it can be seen that it
looks like a linear approximation to the Quadratic Goal Programing Form,
as discussed in Chapter III. Figure 7 shows how a typical dissatisfaction-
deviation diagram might look.
The third step is that of weighting the deviations. One must assign
weights to deviations in the same indifference class. This weighting
is determined by how much of an increase in a deviation would just
offset a unit decrease in the deviation of another goal within the same
indifference class. The object is to minimize the sum of the regret
from all unsatisfactory achievement reflected in positive values for the
slack variables (deviations) of the same indifference class. A positive
weight is attached to the i slack variable when it appears in the
objective function. This weight represents the relative amount of regret
for one unit's unsatisfactory deviation from the goal level.
+
Choosing a numeraire Y." and letting it be Y^
z
numeraire(Y. + AY;, Yt - 1) is indifferent to (Y,, Y^) V Y, t
i=l,...,m z=+,-
»i ayj
W? = a.j a- where oj is arbitrary positive value
So one must force, in some sense, the deviation from the goals in
the same indifference class to be commensurable. If an objective measure-
ment is not available, a subjective decision must be made so that relative









It is possible to postpone the weighting by solving the problem with
equal weight given to every deviation in the same indifference class.
If the deviations in the "solution" are zero, then the weighting is of
no concern. If one variable in the group is positive, it implies that
every variable is positive and therefore all must be weighted.
Gradual refinement of the weights is acceptable if there is explicit
knowledge of the objective function and the constraints (goals). This
may not be the case. If there is an iterative process in which the goals
and the objective function may be modified (as in the Generalized Goal
Decomposition Model), this would probably force the assignment of all
weighting factors in order to give the model some common value on which
to base a "decision." Generally this approach helps determine whether
the goals within indifference class are compatible. If all the goals
were compatible, then there would be no need for weights. In fact there
would be no problem of allocation of scarce resources.
The coefficients of the objective function are a combination of pre-
emptive priority factors and weights. It would appear that a substantial
portion of the problems facing decision making organizations tend to have
a very small number of indifference classes (K+l) and a larger number of
members of the indifference classes. Even though there are some problems
where exactly satisfying one goal is preferred to an infinite deviation
from another goal, the discussion here will be restricted to the investi-
gation of those organizations that can classify deviations from goals
into only one indifference class, that is, lexicographical ordering will
be ignored.
Ijiri's method requires explicit knowledge of the objective function
and the goals to be achieved. He would even prefer trial runs to
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determine if weighting is necessary. Ruefli's Generalized Goal
Decomposition Model requires that weights be determined a priori, i.e.
without any knowledge of the goal levels or organization. Ijiri's
method would require trial runs for successive refinement of weighting
factors and would be complicated in a model that progresses by iterations
In order to derive a solution to an incompatible multiple goal
system, one must order and weight under- and overproduction of goals in
terms of preferences from the viewpoint of the overall organization's
operations. These weighting factors are subjective and reflect how the
organizational hierarchy feels about the goals of the organization and
the interaction of the organization with its environment. Goals must
be satisfied as much as constraints allow. Considering all interactions
permitted by the constraints, the optimal solution is reached in accord-
ance with the orderings and weights assigned to the various goals.
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VI. FORMULATION OF A GOAL PROGRAMING METHOD
FOR DETERMINING WEIGHTING FACTORS
In previous chapters it has been shown how Ruefli's Generalized Goal
Decomposition Model functions and eventually reaches an optimum solution.
However, the resulting solution is a function of the weights assigned to
deviations from the organizational goals. The solution obtained is
determined by the smallest possible weighted sum of goal deviations.
The weights can be considered as the way in which the goals are viewed
by the organization. In many organizations the weights are determined
12
by interactions between managers and the central unit. The model
presented assumes that the managers prefer weights they feel favor their
interests or that reflect what they perceive to be the actual situation;
while the central unit with its overall view of the organization and
especially its view of how the organization fits into its environment,
may want to assign different values. As a hedge against uncertainty,
the weights are determined by interactions as the organization builds
up its objective function.
How exactly is this done? Ijiri's 3-step method has been discussed.
This method tends to have one level, be it the central unit or the
management unit, assigning the values for weights.
Since the organization reaches its decisions through the use of a
goal programing technique (once the weights are known), it seems that a
similar method would be used to determine the weights. Such a goal
programing method allows for interactions between managers and the central
unit which eventually determine the weights for the deviations.
1
2
Smithies, op. cit., p. 7.
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To formulate such a model several assumptions will be needed ^
1. That only the central unit and the management units are involved
in determination of the weights to be used. This agrees with what
Smithies [9] has said regarding the interplay that determines the
weighting factors.
2. That a pseudo level exists between the central unit level and
the management unit level which shall be called the "conference level."
This level contains any number of "conference groups." These conference
groups are the tools that determine the optimum weights via a goal
programing technique.
The conference group receives inputs from both above (central unit)
and below (management units) in the form of goals, H^, and proposals,
Bj
s k • The conference group(s) minimize the sum of the deviation between







by the choice of the activity level
vector Px . ."1 . The formulation for the goal programing problem at








































































is a 1 x n k vector of activity levels associated with the
proposals submitted by each of the n^ management units,
is a 2m x 1 vector of central unit's choice of values for
weighting factors for m goals.
is a 2m x n k matrix where each column is a proposal from
one of the nk management units.
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Z. is a 2m x 1 vector of positive deviations of the proposals
from the goals (central unit's choice of values).
Z^~ is a 2m x 1 vector of negative devaitions.
I
m
is a 2m x 2m identity matrix.
^ is a 2m x 1 vector of shadow prices.
The goals H that appear in the formulation are now only the central
unit's choice of values for weighting factors. The proposals sent up to
the conference group by the management units are now proposed values for
the weighting factors. Thus the goals are now the central unit's choice
of weights while the proposals are the managers' choice of weights. The
individual elements of the activity level vector, x. . , are allowed
J »K
to lie anywhere in [0,1] in order to escape the integer programing
problems that arise. (Ruefli uses this same technique in his GGD model.)
The shadow prices, v. , determined in the solution to the dual problem
are passed up to the central unit and down to the management units.
They are a measure of the relative satisfaction of the goal, and, as in
Riefli's GGD model, they drive the system. A negative shadow price means
that the value of the weighting factor proposed by the management unit
is below the value of the weighting factor as proposed by the central
unit. A positive shadow price is synonymous with the value of the
weighting factor proposed by the management units being greater than the
value proposed by the central unit. The range for these shadow prices
is [-1,1].
Note that the weights for the components of the conference group
objective functions are all equal and set to a value of one. This says
that the deviations from any goal (value for weighting factor) are
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considered of equal importance when the attempt is made to minimize goal
deviations. The actual number or value assigned to the weighting
factors (to be determined by solving this problem) are the measures of
the accuracy/priority of the goal levels used in the decision making
organization. In the author's opinion, it is equally important to the
conference group and to the organization as a whole that every weighting
factor be properly chosen since the weighting factors should reflect
accurate information. Thus there is no need to weight the weights,
since "correct" weights are equal in importance to the functioning of
the organization.
The number of conference groups is up to the central unit. But the
choice of the number and composition of the conference groups is similar
to the choice of the organization structure in the GGD model. And as
such it has the same effect as in the GGD model on the final solution.
The central unit maximizes the inputed values of the weights. It
will tend to reduce the weights, the appropriate elements of H^, that
have not been met by the conference group solution as determined by
those elements with negative shadow prices. It will tend to increase
those weights that have been exceeded in the conference group solution,
i.e. those goal elements (weights) that have a positive shadow price.
The constraints that appear at the central unit level contain information
regarding the priority of the goals and the purpose of the goals. (See
Chapter IV.) These constraints tend to prevent the assignment of weights
that the organization considers as ridiculous. They would also tend to
insure that the weighting factors for high priority goal deviation would
be larger than those assigned for low priority goal deviations.
This model assumes that the central unit is very responsive to the
decisions of the conference groups because its objective function is
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formed from the inputs it receives from all the conference groups. It
then modifies its choice for weights, H., in an attempt to decrease the

















N = # of conference groups
The management units are unique in that they have two often opposing
views to follow. The problem is: how do they implement the decisions
reached by the conference group and passed down to them in the form of
shadow prices, and still follow their own views as to how a specific
goal should be treated. The problem will be biased toward one or the
other of the competing loyalties depending on the structure.
If the management unit's views are neglected it becomes completely
subservient to the central unit constrained only by its more detailed
knowledge of its area of interest. It would become an "organizational
yes man." If the guidance (desires) of the conference group were
neglected, the management unit might act at cross purposes with the
conference group and hence with the organization itself.
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This problem can be handled by constructing a composite objective
function such that one part acts in consonance with the desires of the
conference group while the other part includes the management unit's
own biases. It was decided to include a weighting variable, $ , as a
multiplicative coefficient for the bias portion of the objective function.
By allowing this coefficient to vary from to 1 , the management unit's
behavior would vary from that of being completely subservient to that of
allowing its own bias to fully enter and be a factor in determining the
proposed weighting factors. The portion of the composite objective
function that executed the decisions of the conference group was always
present because the model assumes that a subordinate in a decentralized
organization must always consider the wishes of his superiors. Behavior
to the contrary would not be consistent with the model's assumptions.
Hence the conference group portion of the composite objective function
would always be present.
The formulation of the management unit's problem can be seen below.
The first portion of the objective function is the conference group portion,
Utilizing the shadow prices passed down from the conference group, the
management unit would increase the weights with a negative shadow price
and decrease those with a positive shadow price. Thus the management unit
attempts to generate new proposals (weights) which help minimize the sum
of the deviations. The second portion of the objective function indicates
the bias of the management unit. The bias portion has a multiplicative
coefficient, <|> , which determines the amount of bias that the management
unit allows to influence its objective function. In the minimization
problem, the bias vector tends to force the weights so that what are
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considered by the management unit as high priority goals will have
weights which tend to act as lower bounds, and low priority goals will
have weights which tend to act as upper bounds.
j,ktn Management Unit
1x2m 2mxl 1x2m


























^ is a proposal made up of a selection of weights W^
[Bias Vector]
If i"1 goal component of original organizational decision problem
has a high priority for the j,k^n management unit, the management unit








tn pair in the bias vector would be
[1 -1] since a minimization problem forces W. to be
smaller and W^" to be larger.
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If i tn goal component of original problem has a low priority for







r j n the bias vector would be
[-1 1] since a minimization problem would force
W|< to become larger and W ~ to become smaller.
The constraints found in the management unit problem would contain
restrictions based on information passed down from the central unit in
the initial seed to start the iterative process. The information would
be in terms of organizational ground rules and broad organizational goals.
It might also contain information pertaining to restrictions on feasible
(acceptable) choices of weights and any internal technological goal
coefficients.
By allowing <j> to vary from to 1 , this weighting model could be
used i.n a sensitivity analysis to determine the robustness of the
weighting factors model. It would be a surrogate to seeing how the
behavior and/or attitudes of the management unit affects the choice of
weighting factors. It would be useful in determining the breakpoint in
the attitude of the management unit as this affects the choice of organiza-
tional weighting factors. It should be noted that the first part of the
composite objective function would become the numeraire in the sensitivity
analysis so the robustness of the model would be indicated in terms of
conference group standards (or subservient behavior on the part of the
management unit).
If it were thought that running a sensitivity analysis on the full
range of
<f>
was too time-consuming or computationally difficult, the value
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for <j> could be an arbitrarily assigned value based on a perception of how
it was thought that the specific management unit would act when faced
with conflicting views.
A possible area for further extension of the proposed model is the
incorporation of a central unit that has the same conflicting views as
do the management units. The central unit may believe in its own version





In this thesis Ruefli's Generalized Goal Decomposition Model has
been expanded to include a goal programing method for determining
weighting factors using a separable objective function for the manage-
ment units, which includes both an organizational portion and a subordinate
bias portion. Some necessary restrictions on the choice of weighting
factors were discussed. The Generalized Goal Decomposition Model was
extended to include quadratic deviations from goals, and the function
of shadow prices was compared with the linear deviation formulation.
The interpretation of weighting factors was viewed in the context of a
contemporary organization. A discussion was conducted of some of the
current methods for determining weighting factors including that of
Ijiri. The proposed goal programing model for determining weighting
factors was intended to complement Ruefli's model. Together these
models were better able to represent an organizational decision process.
A sensitivity analysis on the subordinate bias portion of the management
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